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Abstract
The impossibility proof on unconditionally secure quantum bit
commitment is critically reviewed. Different ways of obtaining secure
protocols are indicated.
NOTE: This article is going to appear in the 2002 QCMC Proceedings, and
is based on quant-ph/0207089. It contains a concise summary of several gaps
in the QBC impossibility proof, and a brief description of an unconditionally
secure protocol QBC1. Of all the QBC protocols I have been presenting
so far with various claims, I will in the not-too-distant future elaborate on
which ones are secure as they are, which ones can be modified to be secure,
which ones (such as QBC4) are essentially insecure, and which ones have
undecided security status. This should clarify and correct any ambiguous or
erroneous statements concerning these protocols.
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1 Introduction
There is a nearly universal acceptance of the general impossibility1−4 of
secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type entanglement cheating which rules out
QBC and other quantum protocols that have been proposed for various cryp-
tographic objectives. Since there is no characterization of all possible QBC
protocols, logically there can be no general impossibility proof as maintained
to this date. In this article, which is based on Ref. [5], we explain the nature
of various gaps and incompleteness in the impossibility proof, in addition
to this a priori logical point. They should make clear the fact that there is
no impossibility theorem even in the absence of a specific protocol that has
been proved unconditionally secure. But we also describe an unconditionally
secure protocol QBC1 and other possible approaches for obtaining secure
protocols.
2 The impossibility proof
The essential ideas that constitute the impossibility proof are generally agreed
upon.1−4 Adam and Babe have available to them two-way quantum commu-
nications that terminate in a finite number of exchanges, during which either
party can perform any operation allowed by the laws of quantum physics.
During these exchanges, Adam would have committed a bit with associated
evidence to Babe. It is argued that, at the end of the commitment phase,
there is an entangled pure state |Φb〉, b ∈ {0, 1}, shared between Adam
who possesses state space HA, and Babe who possesses HB. For example,
if Adam sends Babe one of M possible states {|φbi〉} for bit b with prob-
ability pbi, then |Φb〉 =
∑
i
√
pbi|ei〉|φbi〉 with orthonormal |ei〉 ∈ HA and
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given |φbi〉 ∈ HB. Adam would open by making a measurement on HA, say
{|ei〉}, communicating to Babe his result i0 and b; then Babe would verify
by measuring |φbi0〉〈φbi0| on HB, accepting as correct only the result 1.
Generally, Babe can try to identify the bit from ρB
b
, the marginal state of
|Φb〉 on HB, by performing an optimal quantum measurement that yields the
optimal cheating probability P¯Bc for her. Adam cheats by committing |Φ0〉
and making a measurement on HA to open i0 and b = 1. His probability of
successful cheating is computed through |Φb〉, his particular measurement,
and Babe’s verifying measurement; the one optimized over all of his possible
actions will be denoted P¯Ac . For a fixed measurement basis, Adam’s cheating
can be described by a unitary operator UA on HA. When ρB
0
= ρB
1
, i.e.,
P¯Bc = 1/2, U
A is obtained via the Schmidt decomposition of |Φb〉. For un-
conditional, rather than perfect, security, one demands that both cheating
probabilities P¯Bc − 1/2 and P¯Ac can be made arbitarily small when a secu-
rity parameter n is increased.2 Thus, unconditional security is quantitatively
expressed as
(US) lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
, lim
n
P¯Ac = 0. (1)
This condition (1) says that, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an n0 such that for
all n > n0, P¯
B
c − 1/2 ≤ ǫ and P¯Ac ≤ ǫ, to which we refer as ǫ-concealing
and ǫ-binding. These cheating probabilities are to be computed purely on
the basis of physical laws, and thus would survive any change in technology,
including any increase in computational power. One can write down explicitly
P¯Bc =
1
4
(
2 + ‖ρB
0
− ρB
1
‖1
)
. The corresponding P¯Ac satisfies:
5, 6
4(1− P¯Bc )2 ≤ P¯Ac ≤ 2
√
P¯Bc (1− P¯Bc ). (2)
The lower bound in (2) yields the impossibility proof 1, 7
(IP) lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
⇒ lim
n
P¯Ac = 1 (3)
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When random numbers known only to one party are used in the commit-
ment, they are to be replaced by corresponding entanglement purification.
For a random k, it is argued from the doctrine of the “Church of the Larger
Hilbert Space”4 that it is to be replaced by the purification |Ψ〉 inHB1⊗HB2 ,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|ψk〉|fk〉, (4)
where the |fk〉’s are complete orthonormal in HB2 kept by Babe while HB1
would be sent to Adam. Similar purification is to be used for performing
any operation during commitment that might otherwise require an actual
measurement. As a consequence, it is claimed that a shared state |Φb〉 at the
end of commitment is known to both parties.
It appears that there are many incompleteness in the impossibility proof.
For example, one may observe that the cheating probability P¯Ac depends on
Babe’s verifying measurement. For an arbitrary protocol, the impossibility
proof formulation does not, and in fact, cannot specify what the possible
verifying measurements could be. There is no proof given that there cannot
be more than one verifying measurement for which different cheating trans-
formations are needed. When such a situation occurs, Adam may not know
which one to use for a successful cheating. Even though this gap can be
closed, in a proof that is not totally obvious, it is indicative of the incom-
pleteness of the impossibility proof. The followin situations show that the
impossibility proof formulation is actually widely incomplete. A protocol may
involve cheating detection during commitment with corresponding possibility
of aborting the protocol, a situation different from cheat-sensitive protocols8.
It has to be decided what would happen when cheating is detected, say in a
game-theoretic formulation. It makes no sense to keep trying until one party’s
cheating is not detected; some limit on the number of detected cheats must
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be imposed. Assuming both parties are honest not trying to cheat, which
is what the impossibility proof formulation does except for Adam to form
entanglement instead of sending one |φbi〉, also makes no sense because there
would then be no need for a protocol. (Actually, the |φbi〉 entanglement step
is often mistakenly described as an honest one.) These possibilities have not
been accounted for. In the discussions of a proper framework for QBC pro-
tocols in Ref. [5], we have codified some intuitively valid rules for protocol
formation under the names Intent Principle and Libertarian Principle. In
the following, we will discuss several of the many gaps in the impossibility
proof.
3 No impossibility theorem without QBC def-
inition
A plausible first reaction to the impossibility proof is: why are all possible
QBC protocols covered by its formulation? More precisely, how may one
define the necessary feature of an unconditionally secure QBC protocol that
is required for any proof of a mathematical theorem that says such protocol
is impossible? No such definition is available. The situation is similar to the
lack of a definition of an “effectively computable” function in the context
of the Church-Turing thesis. Nobody calls the Church-Turing thesis the
Church-Turing theorem. This is because there is no mathematical definition
of an effectively computable function. The logical possibility is open that
someday a procedure may be found that is intuitively or even physically
effective, but which can compute a nonrecursive arithmetical function.
Thus in the absence of a precise definition of a QBC protocol, one would
have at best an “impossibility thesis”, not an impossibility theorem. (This
view was emphasized to the author by Masanao Ozawa.) Just as there appear
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to be many different forms of effective procedures, there are many different
QBC protocol types5 that appear not to be captured by the impossibility
proof formulation. To uphold just an “impossibility thesis”, one would need
to prove that unconditionally secure QBC is impossible in each of these types.
4 Unknown versus random parameter
The impossibility proof regards any unknown number to one party as a ran-
dom variable with a known probability distribution, from which the purifica-
tion (4) may be formed. However, as it is well-known in classical statistics,
not every unknown parameter is a random variable. In the present situation,
there is an infinite number of open possibilities, such as the number of states
and operations available, that admits no uniform probability distribution or
actual entanglement for the purpose of EPR cheats. Furthermore, there is
simply no ensemble here for the unknown parameter to be averaged over.
In an analogous situation in the quantum information literature, this error
has been recently called the “Partition Ensemble Fallacy Fallacy”9. More
significantly, there is no need for Adam to know the probability {λk} under
concealing for every {λk}. The proper approach is to regard the state |Ψ〉 of
(4) as an unknown “parameter” in an infinite space. The other party does
not need to know it, or to know its probability distribution even if it has one,
because of the following Secrecy Principle which is a corollary of the Intent
Principle and Libertarian Principle.
Secrecy Principle: A party does not need to reveal a secret parameter
chosen by her in whatever manner if it does not affect the security of
the other party, who cannot reject the protocol on such a basis.
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Thus, generation of the secret parameter can be automatized by one party,
and it can be kept secret just as Adam can keep his bit b secret or a secret
key can be kept secret in standard cryptography.
Indeed, with the use of (4) by Babe, it is not sufficient for concealing
to assume that one fixed |Ψ〉 is used by her as done in the impossibility
proof. Two examples are given in Ref. [6], which show that Babe can cheat
by using another {λk} or |Ψ〉 than the one prescribed, and nothing in the
impossibility proof formulation prevents her from doing that. If one imposes
the condition that the protocol is ǫ-concealing for every possible choice of |Ψ〉,
then there is no impossibility proof until one shows that there is a cheating
transformation for Adam which will work for every possible |Ψ〉. In the case
of perfect concealing, this has been proved6 for a single use of (4) by Babe.
The corresponding ǫ-concealing case is yet to be resolved. See the article by
G. M. D’Ariano in this volume for a quantitative discussion.
Note that the Secrecy Principle directly contradicts the claim that a pure
|Φb〉 is openly known at the end of commitment. One consequence is that
because Babe does not know {pbi}, the usual specification of the concealing
condition is a sufficient but not necessary one needed for a general impossi-
bility proof. Furthermore, one has to show that whatever information Adam
lacks on |Φb〉, such as the |fk〉 of (4), is not needed for his cheating. Observe
also that (4) is not equivalent to the mere generation of |ψk〉 with probabil-
ity λk, due to the presence of off-diagonal terms |fk〉〈fk′|. Such purification
has to be considered because of possible entanglement cheating, not because
of the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space. Indeed, entanglement may help
determine the bit through such terms, as the example in the next section
shows. Even with the Church, the two cases are not equivalent.
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5 Shifting of the evidence state space
Even when a pure |Φb〉 is openly known, the impossibility proof does not
cover the situations in which opening and verification are more elaborate,
involving component parts of HA and HB. In particular, consider a protocol
in which Babe forms (4) and sends Adam HB1 , with |ψk〉 = |ψk1〉|ψk2〉 in
HB1 = HB11 ⊗HB12 . Adam randomly switches the state in HB11 to be that
of |ψk1〉 or |ψk2〉 by the unitary perumation Pm, m ∈ {1, 2}, modulates the
resulting state in HB11 by a single Ub for each b, and sends it to Babe. He
opens by revealing b, his random permuation Pm, and returning HB12 . Babe
verifies by testing the apropriate states in HB11 for checking b, and HB12 for
checking that there is no change. It is possible that the protocol is both
concealing and binding for the following reason. For the final committed
state |Φb〉 with Adam entangling the Pm with |ei〉 ∈ HA1 , we have HA =
HA1 ⊗ HB12 and HB = HB11 ⊗ HB2 . Thus, ρB
0
can be close to ρB
1
because
HB12 is not available to Babe for her cheating. However, only HA1 , and
not HA, is avaiable to Adam’s cheating, so he cannot apply the required
cheating UA without being found cheating with a nonvanishing probability.
Using the upper bound in (2) the security condition can be expressed as
ρB
0
(HB12 ⊗HB2) ∼ ρB
1
(HB12 ⊗HB2) and ρB
0
(HB1 ⊗HB2) 6∼ ρB
1
(HB1 ⊗HB2).
To preserve the impossibility proof one would need to show that, in addition
to (3), limn P¯
B
c (HB12 ⊗HB2) = 12 ⇒ limn P¯Bc (HB1 ⊗HB2) = 12 . Clearly, this
has not been proved.
As an example, consider the case HB1 = HB11 ⊗HB12 ⊗HB13 ⊗HB14 of
four qubits, with {|ψk〉} = {|1〉|2〉|3〉|4〉, |4〉|1〉|2〉|3〉, |3〉|4〉|1〉|2〉, |2〉|3〉|4〉|1〉},
where {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉, |4〉} are, e.g., a fixed set S0 of four possible BB84 states
on a given great circle of a qubit. Adam permutes each |ψk〉 by one of four
possible Pm, and returns the first qubit to Babe unchanged for b = 0, while
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shifted by π in the great circie for b = 1. Assume first that Babe either did not
entangle, or cannot use her entanglement in HB2 . Then ρB11
0
(ψk) = ρ
B11
1
(ψk)
for all k, and no entanglement of permutations would produce a rotation on
the first qubit while not disturbing the others. Thus, Adam cannot cheat
perfectly and has a fixed P¯Ac for this protocol which is not arbitrarily close to
one, even though it is perfectly concealing. If one can find a case in which the
protocol remains perfectly concealing with entanglement by Babe, which is
not the case in this example, (IP) of (3) would be contradicted, and the case
can be extended to become an unconditionally secure protocol by repeating
it in a sequence. Such a case can indeed be found in this kind of protocols
which we call Type 2.
6 Protocol QBC1
If carried out honestly, this protocol is conceptually simple and works as
follows.5 Adam sends Babe n qubits with states selected randomly and inde-
pendently from S0. Babe then picks randomly one of these qubits and sends
it back to Adam, who would leave it unchanged or shift it by π, depending
on whether b = 0 or 1, and commit it as evidence. He opens by revealing b
and all the qubit states, and Babe verifies by corresponding measurements.
We assume that no cheating by either party, other than entanglement,
occurs during commitment as in the impossibility proof formulation, say,
under heavy penalty in a game-theoretic formulation where state checking is
done by both parties. Thus the protocol is perfectly concealing. There are
many ways for Babe to randomly pick one of the n qubits, say by permutation
into a fixed qubit among the n ones, or into a separate fixed qubit, each with
its own purification. If Adam knows which particular way Babe chooses, it
can be shown that he can cheat successfully. However, his success depends
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crucially on this knowledge, and no further entanglement purification by
Babe is possible over these different ways that would allow her to send back a
single qubit to Adam for bit modulation. While the situation here has some
similarity to our Type 3 protocols,5, it is one that cannot be completely
purified even with a known probability distribution, and the impossibility
proof does not apply. Thus, the protocol becomes ǫ-binding for large n. A
full security proof of this protocol and detailed treatment of Type 2 protocols
will be presented elsewhere.
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